Local government associations (LGAs) are neglected in the intergovernmental relations and interest group literatures. This article argues that they form a key element in central-local relations. They contribute towards defending local democracy and local discretion through their three roles as the collective voices of local authorities, as countervailing public interest groups in political systems dominated by private interests and as feedback mechanisms for central government actors distant from the localities.
Introduction
Local government associations are an under-researched topic. In their comparative local government collection Goldsmith and Page (2010, p. 259) conclude by stressing the 'continuing and growing importance of national associations representing local government interests and a decline in the importance of personal contacts between local elected officials and higher levels of government'. They argue that local authorities' freedom of action or discretion depends crucially on their access to higher-levels of government, either collectively (e.g. through LGAs) or individually (via clientelistic/personal links). Meanwhile, higher-level actors also manage their relationships with localities through collective negotiations with local government representative bodies. Yet Page, Goldsmith and their contributors provide little evidence and no further conceptual analysis of the role and influence of LGAs while other publications, such as Loughlin, Hendriks and Lidström (2012) , ignore them completely.
LGAs are little covered in the local government and interest group literatures with the notable exceptions of Rhodes (1986) , Entwistle and Laffin (2003) , Cigler (2012) on the US, Schott (2015) on Canada, and Callanan (2012) on LGAs in the EU.
This article contributes to the intergovernmental and interest group literatures by providing conceptual analysis and evidence through a comparative study of LGAs. Local governments' economic and political context has changed substantially since Goldsmith and Page and they are now under considerable financial pressure. Three questions are posed.
Firstly, are local government interests better placed to resist centralization in countries with apparently stronger protections in constitutional institutions or traditions? Secondly, can local government collectively through LGAs effectively defend its interests when central governments tighten their control over localities and spending, especially given the challenges of collectively representing territorial heterogeneity? Thirdly, do other intergovernmental linkages, the parties and professional-bureaucratic channels, compete with or complement
LGAs? As will be seen, LGAs' influence with central governments depends on the institutional relationship with central (and state) governments, LGAs' capacity to manage the representative and collective action problems confronting them as national representatives of local diversity and democracy, and the role of other critical interest groupings -especially the political parties and technocratic/professional-bureaucratic complexes -which also coordinate intergovernmental relationships.
LGAs as hybrid organizations
LGAs are hybrid organisations combining both interest group and governmental characteristics. They resemble interest groups in that they lobby governments but are 'not just another special interest' as they pursue 'benefits not limited to their members' (Cigler, 2012; Rhodes, 1986, pp. 11-12) . Firstly, they claim legitimacy as they represent elected governments so are subject to public accountability in contrast to private sector organisations, especially as they provide a counterbalance to private and sectoral interests. Secondly, this legitimacy means that they typically enjoy insider, high-level access to ministers and officials, available to few other interest groups. This access also reflects the extent to which central policymakers recognise LGAs as providers of valuable, bottom-up feedback, aggregating information from diverse localities. Thirdly, they are 'topocratic' as their authority is territorially based and defined as opposed to functionally-based, 'technocrats' whose interests are limited to particular services (Beer, 1978; Rhodes, 1986, p. 12) and to partisans or party politicians whose interests typically trump those of territory. This hybrid status is analysed in three parts: (1) the relationship between central government and LGAs; (2) LGAs capacity to manage the dilemmas of collectively representing territorial heterogeneity, to mobilise its membership and deploy its resources; and (3) the extent of competition from other political and social interests.
LGAs as corporatist partners or pluralistic players
LGAs' intermediating role can be located along a pluralist-corporatist continuum. In pluralist intermediation, a LGA is a player in a pluralist arena competing with other interests and resorting primarily to the characteristic interest group strategies of lobbying ministers, senior officials and parliamentarians, and forming allegiances with other interest groups. In corporatist intermediation a LGA is a privileged peak body in close partnership with central government, which plays 'a leading role in orchestrating interest group participation in the policy process' (Granados & Knoke, 2005, p. 293 ). An LGA negotiates with central government and can offer central actors guarantees that any agreements made will be implemented by their members. At the same time LGA leaders are caught in the classic, corporatist tension (Streeck & Kenworthy, 2002) between pursuing 'a logic of influence', what they need to do to influence regional or national actors, and a 'logic of membership', what they have to do to ensure their members implement any agreements made with government.
Typically, LGAs enjoy good access to central policy makers. This access may indicate political significance, but it does not necessarily mean influence. Nonetheless, access does provide LGA actors with opportunities to become aware of how issues are perceived by central policymakers and of any policy initiatives earlier rather than later in the policy process; and ' [b] y being in the process, [interest groups] are in a position to achieve partial gains and to avoid the even larger losses that might have ensued had they not been on the scene (Schlozman at al., 2012, p. 309) . Indeed, the extent of contacts with members of parliament, access to the bureaucracy and media presence are relevant proxy measures of interest group influence given the difficulties of measuring interest group influence (Eising, 2016) . Of course, access may come at a price as central policymakers can use access as a strategy to capture or coopt LGA leaders.
Given the difficulties of assessing influence, LGAs' influence should be judged against what might be expected of other interest groups. Interest groups are only occasionally associated with major change as the political system status quo tends to be unchanging (cf. Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball & Leech, 2009) . To exercise influence they are highly dependent on change-supporting windows of opportunity, resources of expertise and strong alliances with other actors. Not unexpectedly, then, LGAs have often not succeeded in halting major central government policy initiatives, especially relating to the overall control of public spending and burden-shifting services downwards. Moreover, evidence of policy influence is more likely to be during implementation rather than agenda-setting or decision-making points in the policy-making process. Interest group lobbying is not necessarily about changing actors' minds. Chalmers (2011) argues that the literature indicates that groups generally support sympathetic policymakers, 'they tend to lobby friends, not foes ' (p. 472) . Thus, interest groups should be seen as 'service bureaus' which offer a 'form of professional labour to friendly decision-makers' (Chalmers, 2011, p 472) . Although 'service bureau' understates the aggressive (but seldom public) influence exercised by many business lobbies (Scholzman, Verba & Brady, 2012) , the phrase captures LGAs' emphasis on providing information and expert opinion to central actors. It is important also to recognise that many LGA activities serve general objectives like safer streets, rubbish collection and recycling, environmental health regulations, issues which affect everyone but which seldom make the political headlines.
LGAs and collective action and representation
LGAs have to mobilise and maintain their membership to be effective in lobbying central government but face internal collective action problems (Cigler, 2012 , p. 266, drawing on Olson 1965 ).
LGAs provide collective benefits to their members, such as a unified voice on intergovernmental issues, but many of these benefits could be enjoyed by non-members freeriding on an association. Moreover, many individual authorities prioritise their search for special treatment or funding for themselves over joining collective action. To encourage local governments to belong, then, LGAs offer selective benefits to members -such as policy updates, other policy reports, conferences with key influential speakers and specific advice to authorities (Schott, 2015, p. 165) . As Schott argues, LGAs have to balance advocacy against member services, if they are perceived as dedicating too much resource to advocacy rather than member services, members may withdraw support.
However, the collective action problem also arises as LGA leaders puzzle over collective representation -forming policy responses and positions despite being 'a contradiction in terms' as they represent local concerns nationally (Rhodes, 1986, p. 404) . They have to generalize when their defence of local government necessarily celebrates local diversity and develop national policy stances while their members are focussed on 'local' problems (Rhodes, 1986, p. 405) . At the same time, they are divided by cleavages such as rural/urban divide, big city/towns, institutional status (e.g. county v district) and declining/growing areas.
Central policymakers face similar problems in making policy but they have to consider society-wide redistributive and regulatory perspective and functions. They tend to perceive problems in terms of territorial equality, service quality, cost and functional/service-based coordination. Central government policymakers need to generalise for instance over determining territorial funding formula to limit, at least excessively, unequal funding across local governments. Typically, central policymakers reference arguments about avoiding postcode lotteries service in quality and the search for coordination. Yet politically contentious and partisan issues are often couched in secrecy with LGAs excluded from discussions.
LGAs in a competitive arena
Intergovernmental relations cannot be understood solely in terms of territorially-based, centre-
LGA relations. Two other sets of interests are involved -the party political and the professional-bureaucratic -neither of which necessarily align with territorially-based local government interests. Firstly, the relationship between parties and LGAs is critical (omitted from Goldsmith & Page, 2010) . The political parties are the engines of major change, rather than interest groups, yet only recently have authors explored the role of parties in coordinating government policy (e.g. Bolleyer, 2011; Laffin, Shaw & Taylor, 2007) . Secondly, tensions exist between territorial interests and those within the big spending service or department-based vertical channels (such as education, social services and health) linking governmental levels.
These links are top-down, with a tendency to identify local governments as agents of the centre.
Meanwhile, the central, or state-level, government department responsible for local government often strains to assert the local, territorial interest within government against the powerful service departments.
CASES AND METHODS
Three Northern European governmental systems are selected rather than Southern European systems, where municipalities are less significant than clientelistic linkages (Goldsmith & Page, 2010) . In all three countries, local government is responsible for roughly a quarter of public spending, and offer telling institutional contrasts to enable comparison -England is a majoritarian system with no formal constitutional protection for local government, Germany a federal constitutional system with some formal protection for councils, and the Netherlands a LGA
STRATEGIES IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL ARENA England
English local government is subject to a powerful political executive which dominates Parliament and can abolish or reform councils to an extent unparalleled elsewhere in Europe. England is also characterised by a 'lack of consistent channels of influence and contact between the centre and the localities' comparable to those found in most other European countries (John & Copus, 2012, p. 35) . Two other key features are the absence of constitutional protections and of an active judicial institution -while judicial review is possible, the few court cases heard have largely proven unsuccessful for local government (Wilson & Game, 2011, p. 174 The unified Local Government Association was created in 1997 through a merger of the three previous associations which had separately represented county councils, metropolitan councils and districts. The merger was urged by central government and the political parties largely in the interests of avoiding 'pointless' turf wars among the three associations (Entwistle, 2002) . The merger meant that for central government actors much of the political awkwardness of managing institutional and territorial diversity was devolved to the LGA leadership.
Presently the LGA represents 349 out of the 353 English local authorities, and all of the 22
Welsh local authorities via the Welsh LGA. The LGA has a County Council Network, Districts
Network and the Metropolitan Special Interest Group among other internal Groups reflecting persistent cleavages. It also has mechanisms such as understandings not to make specific policies on especially divisive issues (e.g. over local government reorganisation), and internal party organisations and conventions to restrain the potentially disruptive impact of party politics. Regional
LGAs also exist -most notably the Welsh LGA and 'London Councils'
representing all the London Boroughs (three London Boroughs do not belong to the LGA). The
LGA's income (2016-17) is just under £20m, half of which is member subscriptions, and employs over 30 staff (75 senior officers). The LGA also has an agency, the Local Government Improvement and Development almost entirely funded by a £30m central government grant. LGA and council professionals over technical issues. Officially, financial settlements reflect need assessments but party-political considerations have long influenced weightings in the assessments, which has reduced the adverse financial effects of centrally-imposed austerity measures for councils when national-local party-political symmetry exists (De Widt, 2016; Ward & John, 1999) .
The LGA has acquired responsibility for a new Sector-Led Improvement (SLI) replacing Labour's centrally-directed performance management system. SLI is a voluntary programme of peer review challenges conducted by local authority leaders, chief executives and other senior officers. SLI is based on the principles that authorities should be responsible for their own performance and improvement and take collective responsibility for the performance of the sector (evidenced by sharing best practice, offering member and officer peers etc.). The SLI looks like a strong assertion of localism against almost 30 years of centralism through regulatory intensification by previous Conservative and Labour governments. However, Murphy and Jones (2016, p. 699) argue that the voluntary nature of SLI raises the question of how persistent underperformance by a local authority will be managed in the absence of central intervention.
Germany
The German federal system provides the strongest constitutional protection for municipalities, out of the three countries, although, unlike the states (Länder), they are not incorporated into the Federal Council (Bundesrat). While the state governments have constitutional responsibility for local government, a federal constitutional guarantee of local self-government exists guaranteeing that councils should be able to fix part of their budget by local preferences (Buettner, Holm-Hadulla, Parsche, & Starbatty, 2008, p. 14) . The consultation of local interest associations has also become mandatory in all states (Vetter, 2010, p. 104) Although NRW lacks an independent grant allocation commission (unlike some German states), the grant allocation process is more transparently organized than in England and the Netherlands. This transparency involves just five indicators in the general grants distribution formula and prioritizes population size. Even so this redistribution mechanism creates much inter-local controversy, given heterogeneous local interests. Although those interviewed in the LGAs stressed their common positions, the LGAs consistently failed to reach consensus on finance-related issues. The redistribution system is especially contentious as every change within the funding system has implications for which type of authority gets what. Thus, the NRW Interior Ministry has to balance the advantages of simplicity in a grant system against that of minimizing inter-local tensions. The advantage is that transparency and simplicity in grant funding makes it more difficult for both local and state level actors to manipulate grant allocations. In particular, undue partisan influence is easily detected. The straightforward design, too, means that local officers can calculate their allocation once the total funding amount is announced and so the system generates high certainty.
Federally, LGAs are also crowded out by a lack of shared interests amongst the states.
The view of NRW Finance Ministry officials was that they had little scope to influence the When the federal government negotiates with the states, safeguarding local finances is not a primary concern. It is the states, of which the local level is part of, who have the main responsibility to watch over local level interests.
Thus, the federal assumption is that the Federal Council, comprising state representatives, has the responsibility to represent, indirectly at least, local interests. Yet the federal LGAs emphasised that they found it very difficult to get the states to listen to their criticism of Hartz IV. It would seem, based on interviewees' accounts, that party-political linkages were critical and the federal-state are stronger than state-local linkages. Federal ministers used party linkages to persuade state governments of the same party to support their policies. Thus, state governments, like NRW, accepted the federal government's proposals. As an LGA interviewee observed, the states 'failed to demonstrate the assertiveness required to protect the financial interests of their own local government sector'.
More recently the institutional safeguards have improved, especially following the states' adoption of the Connectivity Principle restricting the ability of state governments to decentralise unfunded tasks to local government. Following its introduction in NRW in 2004,
NRW
LGAs have successfully used the Connectivity Principle in several cases in the NRW state court to compel the state to reconsider its local funding procedures (e.g.
Kinderförderungsgesetz in 2010)
. Although the Principle does not directly apply to federal legislation, it now provides an incentive for the states to be more assertive at the federal level in defending the financial interests of local government, as it is the states who will be held responsible, through the Connectivity Principle, if unfunded mandates are assigned to municipalities. The 2006 Federalism Reform I also prohibits the federal government from assigning new tasks directly to the local level. It now has to negotiate with the states which, consequent on the state-level Connectivity Principles, are more sensitive to LGA demands. The federal response to local financial pressures has been mainly to re-federalize the 'Basic insurance for pensioners' from 2012. It also gave federal LGAs better representation in federal policymaking processes, such as requiring federal departments to consult LGAs on relevant legislative proposals (Henneke, 2012, p. 215) .
LGA leaders stressed that the Connectivity Principle was the most significant measure strengthening their position. Yet they emphasised that the Connectivity Principle has not fundamentally changed the German system, and provided less protection in practice than a formal institutional analysis would imply. Firstly, the Principle can intensify rather than reduce intergovernmental tensions, as state departments seek to work around rather than with local governments. An interviewee at NRW's County
Association recalls:
The introduction of the Connectivity Principle has led to an almost phobia among some of NRW's state departments against transferring any new tasks to the local sector. They prefer to work with their own agencies, as they reason working with 'the local sector is too much of a hassle'. 
The Netherlands
Dutch municipalities exist within a 'small consensual-corporatist state, where decision-making is about "eternal" deliberation, consultation and compromising' (Kickert, 2012, p. 300) . The Dutch intergovernmental system emphasizes government policy on equality in public service provision (Goedhart, 1989, p. 680 ) and the convention is that central government avoids unilateral decisions affecting subnational interests. The Association of Dutch Municipalities (VNG) is a unified LGA, representing all 388 municipalities. Steen and Toonen (2010, p. 159) stress that the VNG is 'an important partner in central-local consultation and negotiation' and one of our interviewees described it as the second most influential Dutch lobby group after the Dutch Employers' Federation. It has a budget of 111.1 million euros and significantly is heavily dependent on central government funding (79.6 million euros (71.6%) with membership fees constituting just 18.6% of income (20.7m) and other revenues 9.7% (10.8m) (VNG, 2017) .
From an institutional perspective, the decentralized-unitary constitutional nature of the Dutch government system involves several formal and informal practices apparently favourable to local government interests and the negotiating position of the VNG. Firstly, general grant funding to local government is closely tied into the central government budget, by connecting general local government funding to the central government's corrected net expenditure. This methodology ensures that the majority of local funding is shared equally with the central services if government expenditure increases, and it supposedly prevents local government from suffering disproportionately if it decreases. Although interviewees in the VNG recognised that the mechanism offers some protection for local funding, they were critical of central government's decision to 'switch it off' during the three years following the financial crisis 2009 (Rfv, 2012 , with adverse consequences for local finances.
A second intergovernmental tradition that seems to safeguard local government interests is the maximization of the maximum financial reduction considered to be permissible … it's a kind of sport for departments to mirror the financial consequences of proposed reforms as favourable as possible to all actors, so it [drafting the financial appendix] doesn't go well automatically.
The issue partly reflects the Interior Ministry's loss of authority and capacity to evaluate effectively other departments' financial impact assessments as it has been eclipsed by the big service departments and the Finance Ministry. VNG interviewees reflected that this loss of status made it sometimes more difficult to build political-bureaucratic coalitions favourable to local interests. For the VNG, this problem has been aggravated by strong competition from interest groups with a strong service rather than territorial focus. These service-oriented interest groups maintain strong links to the service departments, such as the association of Dutch health insurers that maintains strong links to the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport. As they stress uniform nationwide service levels, the service-oriented interest groups clash with local government interest groups, as the VNG maintain the view that cost effective decentralization can only occur if subnational entities are equipped with sufficient implementation autonomy, a position fiercely opposed by non-territorial interest groups who fear widening inter-local differences in service levels.
Beyond the Interior Ministry, other organisations including the independent Financial
Relations Council, and the Bofv, a high level working group on intergovernmental financial relationships, strengthen the local government voice at the central level. Whilst interviewees emphasize that these organisations represent significant access points into national policymaking processes, the personal contacts of local government representatives, such as mayors, with central government policymakers, including government ministers were seen as more critical. The in practice central appointment of mayors and the high levels of rotation between local and national level politicians -in both directions -are more significant in ensuring that local views are included in central policymaking processes. However, it is a relatively narrow representation of local interests as it is often dominated by the voice of the big cities and the VNG leadership. The need to rebalance this interest representation has led to several initiatives to improve diversity in the association's interest representation such as the formation of G32 as an association of midsize cities, and P10, a collaboration of large rural municipalities. Unusually, the Big Decentralizations negotiations saw the big cities siding with other municipalities in rejecting the initial agreement which the VNG leadership had reached with Cabinet. This interrupted a pattern in the VNG whereby large municipalities tend to endorse the VNG leadership in favouring decentralization often despite opposition from the smaller municipalities who fear increased financial burdens.
Over recent years the key issues have been the 'Big Decentralization' programme and (BZK, 2015) . But many local level interviewees criticized the VNG leadership for being co-opted by central government as they saw it pursuing its organizational interests rather than members' interests.
Partly because of membership resistance, the VNG leadership re-entered negotiations with central government in 2013, and was able to extract significant financial concessions from central government. For example, 200 million euro extra funding was made available to support the transition of tasks from the central to the local level (one-off funding), and around 325 million euro extra funding annually for two of the major decentralized tasks (Wmo and PV budget) (VNG, 2013) . However, the reform package eventually implemented was still perceived as containing substantial risks, with an analysis by the independent CPB concluding that they entail a risk that municipalities will provide 'less of the decentralized services than socially desirable' (CPB, 2015, p. 5) .
During the Big Decentralizations negotiations, the VNG only had a significant impact after it had been reined in by its members, and the association's tougher negotiation approach 
CONCLUSIONS
This conclusion will summarise the three cases and advance some generalisations about LGAs based around the three questions posed relating to (1) the role of constitutional institutions and traditions in protecting local government, (2) the dilemmas of collectively representing territorial heterogeneity and (3) how other IGR linkages, mainly the parties and professionalbureaucratic channels, compete or complement LGAs. The Dutch VNG highlights the potential for, and limits of, central co-optation through a corporatist-partnership, in this case, underpinned by Dutch co-governance traditions. Central government support, especially as the main funder of the VNG plus central influence over mayoral appointments, reduced the VNG leaders' dependence on the membership. The VNG's political and bureaucratic leadership then developed their own interest in cooperating with the centre to increase the association's income and responsibilities. However, this pursuit of the logic of influence during the Big Decentralizations was circumscribed by member municipalities which meant the leadership had to return to the centre to ask for further concessions.
In contrast, the English case illustrates how an LGA in a more pluralist arena, with fewer well-established conventions and institutional arrangements underpinning its position, has had to adapt to uneven access opportunities to central government which fluctuate significantly according to shifts in party control and ministerial style. The LGA political and official leadership has had to work hard to maintain close to 100% membership given the lack of a strong institutionalised relationship with the centre, its dependency on membership fees and the increasing assertiveness of powerful territorial interests within and outside the LGA, especially the big cities. Most recently the LGA political leadership has largely been a spectator to the introduction of the sub-regional mayoralties. It has tended to move towards a service bureau role under the pressure of these cleavages which suggests that the more pluralist the arena, the more likely that a LGA will operate as a service bureau.
The German case shows how federal structures tend to crowd out or marginalize local government interests (Cigler, 2012 , makes a similar point in the US) and how multiple levels complicate local government lobbying activities. The 'joint decision traps' (Scharpf, 1988) , LGAs' roles and relationships at state level, and so indirectly at federal level, although many of the key battles over unfunded mandates had already been lost by the time it was introduced.
These cases indicate that LGAs can be significant actors at least part of the time. The Dutch case suggests that well-grounded constitutional and cooperative conventions can enable
LGAs to mitigate, but seldom prevent, centrally-imposed reforms and draconian cutbacks. In particular, these conventions mean that it is difficult for central actors unilaterally to change the rules (but not unknown). Even so Dutch LGAs, and German LGAs, have faced significant challenges in limiting major direct and indirect cuts through burden-shifting. In the absence of such well-grounded conventions, English local government has endured considerably more reorganizations and severe cutbacks with limited consultation. One parliamentary report has considered a code to protect local government (PCRC, 2012) . Even if a code providing strong local government protections was introduced, it would remain a largely pious statement as it would be ungrounded in a wider system of established constitutional conventions of the type found in Germany and the Netherlands. Nonetheless, the position of English local government could be strengthened if funding mechanisms were more transparent and determined more independently. However, as the NRW's experience illustrates, there is a trade-off between increased simplicity and responding to inter-local diversity and territorial inequalities.
LGAs routinely enjoy easy access to key policymakers and are extensively consulted by them, all of which suggests that they have some influence. Their leaders would argue that they have occasionally deflected central policy initiatives inimical to local government (which is difficult to prove) and maintained pressure on central policymakers over many low profile issues -such as rubbish disposal, road maintenance and safer streets -which are vital public LGAs are significant not just as key players in those relations and but also as telling indicators of the shifting balance of power between central and local governments, and no study of central-local relations should neglect these associations. As such further comparative research on LGAs promises to provide further vital insights into how central and local policymakers seek to manage pressing contemporary territorial questions -such as how the interests of big cities can be balanced against those of smaller towns, urban areas against rural interests, and growing against declining areas.
